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INTRODUCTION 
Human settlement issues and problems are becoming the focus 
of increasing concern among national governments in many West and 
East European countries, in North America, and in parts of the 
Third World. Programs to encourage the development of economi-
cally declining regions, to stem the growth of large urban centers, 
and to revitalize the central areas of e xpanding metropolises are 
parts of national agendas all over the globe . A notable example 
is the work of the US Commission on Population Growth and the 
American Future, which devoted one of its e i ght research reports 
entirely to the subject of population distribution policy (1]. 
Although much of the Commission's attention was directed at 
national population growth and its consequences, for its research 
report, Population , Distribution , and Policy , it commissioned 
papers that directly addressed issues and problems of human settle-
ment and internal migration [1, pp.XIV-XV] : 
Major national attention and the Commission's 
primary focus has been on national population growth . 
But national growth implies local growth as additional 
population is distributed in the rural areas, small 
towns, cities and suburbs across the country. And 
choices we make about national population growth 
cannot help but have important meaning for local 
areas . . .. 
Where people move inevitably affects the distribu-
tion of the population and the growth of local areas . 
As ~ result, any national d istribution po licy wi ll , to 
s ome deg r ee , try to in terv ene i n t he migration proces s 
by encouraging people to move to one place rather than 
another or not to move at all. 
Despite the general recognition that migration processes and 
settlement patterns are intimately related, one nevertheless finds 
that the dy namics of their interrelationships are not well under-
stood . An important reason for this lack of understanding is that 
demographers have in the past accorded migration a status subser-
vient to fertility and mortality, and have almost totally ignored 
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the spatial dimension of population growth. * Thus, whereas prob-
lems of fertility and mortality long ago stimulated a rich and 
scholarly literature, studies of migration have only recently 
begun to flourish. Consequently, one finds today a rather large 
and growing body of scholarly work on migration awaiting a sys-
tematic synthesis (e.g., [2,3,4)). The contributions of socio-
logists in identifying migration differentials (the "who" of 
migration), of geographers in analyzing directional migration 
streams (the "where" of migration), and of economists in examin-
ing the determinants and consequences of internal migration (the 
"why" and "so what" of migration) still have not been systemati-
cally synthesized into a unified general theory of internal mi-
gration. 
Out of the recently growing literature on migration, we at 
lIASA have identified and isolated four related research subtasks 
that are of particular relevance to our long-term general inter-
ests in national settlement systems and strategies (see Figure 1). 
They are: 
* 
The study of spatial population dynamics; 
The definition and elaboration of a new research 
area called demomet r i c s and its application to 
migration analysis and spatial population 
forecasting; 
The analysis and design of migration and settlement 
po l ic y ; 
A comparati ve s tudy of national migration and settle-
ment patterns and policies. 
MIGRATION & 
SETTLEMENT 
TASK (MST) 
DYNAMICS 
DEMOMETRICS 
POLICY 
COMPARATIVE 
STUDY 
Figure 1. Migration and settlement study. 
There are, of course, a few notable exceptions, e.g., the 
work of Peter Morrison in the USA and that of Leroy Stone in 
Canada and of V.I. Perevedentsev in the USSR. 
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THE FOUR PRINCIPAL SUBTASKS 
Dynamics 
The evolution of every spatial human population is governed 
by the interactions of births, deaths, and migration. Individu-
als are born into a population, age with the passage of time, 
reproduce, and ultimately leave the population because of death 
or outmigration. These events and flows enter into an accounting 
relationship in which the growth of a regional population is de-
termined by the combined effects of natural increase (births minus 
deaths) and net migration (inmigrants minus outmigrants). This 
subtask focuses on such relationships in order to identify and 
clarify some of the more fundamental spati al population dynamics 
involved. In addition to its general concern with the expansion 
of our knowledge of spatial mathematical demography, the dynamics 
subtask is also focusing on problems of model schedules and pop-
ulations, sensitivity analysis, spatial zero population growth 
and aggregation-decomposition procedures (see Figure 2). 
SPATIAL MATHEMATICAL DEMOGRAPHY 
MODEL SCHEDULES & POPULATIONS 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
SPATIAL ZERO POPULATION GROWTH 
AGGREGATION AND DECOMPOSITION 
Figure 2. Dynamics. 
The age-specific fertility, mortality, and migration sched-
ules of most human multiregional populations exhibit remarkably 
persistent regularities (see Figure 3). The age profiles of these 
schedules seem to be repeated, with only minor differences, in 
virtually all developed and developing nations. Conseguently, 
demographers have found it possible to summarize and codify such 
regularities by means of hypothetical schedules called model 
schedules. 
Model schedules have two important applications: they may 
be used to infer (or "smooth") empirical schedules of populations, 
for which the requisite data are lacking (or inaccurate); and 
they can be applied in analytical mathematical examinations of 
population dynamics. 
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The development of model fertility and model mortality 
schedules and their use in studies of the evolution of human. 
populations have received a considerable amount of attention 
(8,9,10,11]. The construction of model migration schedules and 
their application to studies of the spatial evolution of human 
populations disaggregated by region of residence, however, have 
not. We at IIASA are addressing this latter question, and have 
been able to show how techniques that have been successfully 
applied to treat the former problem can readily be extended to 
deal with the latter. 
In the realm of spatial mathematical demography, every demo-
graphic change may be traced back to a change in age-specific 
fertility, mortality, and migration rates. But how do changes 
in these rates affect the dynamics of the spatial demographic 
system? This question is the subject of our studies in sensi-
tivity analysis. We have derived a set of sensitivity functions 
that relate a change in spatial demographic statistics to a cor-
responding change in component rates. The primary purpose of 
this analysis is to contribute to the knowledge of spatial popu-
lation dynamics by presenting a unifying technique of impact 
assessments. In single-region mathematical demography, ordinary 
differential calculus is used to perform such sensitivity analy-
sis. In multiregional demography, where we deal with matrix and 
vector functions, the application of ordinary calculus is very 
complicated, and matrix differentiation techniques must be applied. 
We have used such mathematical tools to derive analytical expres-
sions that establish the impacts of changing rates on multiregion-
al life table statistics, population projections, and stable popu-
lation characteristics. These sensitivity functions reveal how 
each spatial demographic characteristic depends on age-specific 
rates and how it reacts to changes in those rates. 
Increasing concern about the sizes and growth rates of 
national populations has generated a vast literature dealing with 
the socio-economic and environmental consequences of a reduction 
of fertility to replacement levels and the consequent evolution 
of national populations to a zero-growth condition called station -
arity. But where people choose to live in the future presents 
issues and problems that are potentially as serious as those posed 
by the number of children they choose to have. The ways in which 
stabilization of a national population is likely to affect migra-
tion and local growth have received very little attention and 
merit careful study. 
We have considered some of the redistributional consequences 
of an immediate reduction of fertility to bare replacement levels. 
This analysis has been carried out using the mathematical appa-
ratus developed by demographers to analyze the evolution of 
national populations to zero growth, with an appropriate extension 
to include the spatial impact of internal migration. Such an ex-
tension shows that stabilization of the regional populations in 
a multiregional system will alter the relative contributions of 
natural increase and migration to regional growth. Regional age 
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compositions will also be affected, and in ways that are strongly 
influenced by the age patterns of migration. Retirement havens, 
for example, will receive proportionately higher flows of inmi-
grants as a national population increases in average age, where-
as destinations that previously attracted mostly younger migrants 
will receive proportionately fewer inmiqrants. Finally, the 
redistributional effects of stabilization will depend in a very 
direct way on the redistributional pattern of total births that 
is occasioned by fertility reduction. 
During the past two decades social scientists have come to 
model dynamic socio-economic systems of growing size and complex-
ity. Despite a heavy reliance on ever more sophisticated high-
speed digital computers, their capacity for handling S'lch systems 
has not kept pace with the growing demands for more detailed 
information. Consequently, it is becoming especially important 
to identify those aspects of a system that permit one to deal 
with parts of it independently from the rest or to treat relation-
ships among particular subsystems as though they were independent 
of the relationships within those subsystems. These questions 
are, respectively, those of decomposition and aggregation, and 
their application toward "shrinking" large-scale population pro-
jection models is one element of our spatial population dynamics 
subtask. 
Demometrics 
In 1938, the US National Resources Committee published a 
major demographic study which, after adopting a set of "reason-
able" assumptions with regard to future fertility, mortality and 
net immigration, projected the total US population in 1980 to be 
158 million, at which time it was also to have reached a state 
of equilibrium. The US population passed the 158 million mark 
less than fifteen years later and today exceeds 210 million. 
It is difficult to fault such projections, for it is very 
unlikely that any competent demographer, faced with the same 
situation, would have come up with a radically different set of 
projections. How then, can the accuracy of such exercises in 
social prediction be improved? We at IIASA believe that the 
development of a discipline called de mometrics is a necessary 
first step (see Figure 4). 
MIGRATION THEORY 
URBAN LABOR-FORCE DYNAMICS 
URBAN-REGIONAL ECONOMETRIC MODELS 
Figure 4. Demometrics. 
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In the field of ~conomics a division is generally made 
between the areas of ma t hema ti c al e conomic s and e conometrics. 
The former deals principally with abstract mathematical descrip-
tions of economic dynamics and economic growth; the latter treats 
statistically-estimated relationships between basic economic 
variables. Analogous distinctions are made to distinguish mathe-
matical psychology from psychometrics, mathematical biology from 
biometrics, and mathematical sociology from sociometrics. In a 
similar vein, we at IIASA are distinguishing mathematical demog-
raphy from demometr~cs, the development and elaboration of which 
forms the major focus of the second of the four principal sub-
tasks in the migration and settlement study. 
In a broad sense, demometrics is concerned with the unified 
application of mathematical and statistical methods to the study 
of demographic phenomena. The principal aim of this discipline 
is to establish empirically quantitative relationships between 
demographic and socio-economic variables. It is important not 
to confuse this activity with mathematical demography and sta-
tistical techniques (as does Winkler (12]), or with demographic 
statistics (as does the layman) . Demometrics is distinguisnea 
by its fusion of the deductive approach of mathematics, the 
inductive approach of statistics , and the causal approach of 
demographic theory. 
The 1938 projection by the US National Resource Committee, 
like most projections today, did not link demographic variables 
with economic variables . Until very recently, this has been a 
standard practice i n both d i sciplines. That is, demographers 
typically have given economic variables only cursory treatment 
in their models , and economists have accorded .demographic vari-
ables a similar status . In the words of Hoover (13, p.73]: 
Purely demographic and purely economic models ... are 
multitudinous and often highly complex. This makes even 
more striking the relatively primitive state of the art 
that prevails in the linking of demographic and economic 
variables. 
Much of our work in the demometrics subtask is directed 
toward advancing the state of the art in this fledgling activity . 
Our fundamental approach has been to couple an economic model 
with a demographic model by means of linkages through the con-
sumption and labor sectors (see Figure 5). The former linkage 
appears in the form of a consumption function that demands the 
economy to produce a certain output for the population to consume 
The latter linkage takes the form of a migration labor-force 
equilibrating model that views the demoqraphic model as the 
supplier of labor and the economic model as the demander of labo1 
The two models operate recursively in developing forecasts of 
demographic and economic growth that are internally consistent . 
The consistent-forecasting framework just outlined has led 
us to consider in some detail two related areas of research : 
migration theory, and urban labor-force dynamics. 
.s 
1e. 
>r. 
EXOG EN OUS 
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-9-
ECONOMIC 
MODEL 
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Figure 5. Consistent demographic-economic forecasting. 
Theory- and model-building in the field of migration 
research has both a micro- and a macro-dimension. The former is 
dominated by the economist's perspective of migration as an in-
vestment in human capital--a perspective which holds that 
"migration may be viewed as a comparison of the present value of 
the benefits and costs of moving" l14, p.365]. The macrotheory 
of migration, on the other hand, focuses on aggregate movements 
and, like macro-economics, generally fails to relate in any 
precise manner its theories with those concerning individual 
decision-making (i.e., the microtheory). 
Although an economic model forecasts the quantity of labor 
that will be demanded, it is important to know how much of that 
labor will be supplied by the resident population and how much 
by new migrants. Inmigration, for example, implies a larger 
population, whereas a change in the labor-force participation 
rate of residents does not. Both sources of labor supply com-
pete for the same jobs, and each introduces a different influ-
ence on the ultimate forecast. 
A large literature on urban labor-force dynamics is avail-
able. In the past, much of it has been concerned with proving 
or disproving the "added worker" and "discouraged worker" 
hypotheses [15] . Recently, attention has been directed at the 
dynamics of the job search process itself (16]. We believe that 
this body of literature will ultimately provide the connecting 
link between urban migration and labor-force dynamics; conse-
quently, an increasing amount of our research effort is being 
directed toward establishing such a connection . 
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Policy 
The policy analysis and design subtask of the migration and 
settlement study is surveying the fundamental dimensions of cur-
rent national migration and settlement policies. In particular , 
it is examining the consequences of migration, those affecting be 
the origin region and the destination region. And it is evaluatj 
the utility of the "optimal policy" paradigm of Tinbergen that re 
cently has been usefully applied by mathematical economic planner 
(see Figure 6). 
INDIVIDUAL CONSEQUENCES OF MIGRATION 
SOCIETAL CONSEQUENCES OF MIGRATION 
OPTIMAL POLICY MODELS 
Figure 6. Policy. 
A wide variety of countries are striving to channel urban 
growth to certain regions and to divert it from others. Gener-
ally, such national urbanization or human settlement policies 
have beell defended on the grounds of either national efficiency 
or regional equity. The arguments often are framed in terms of 
an underlying conceptual framework known as "growth-pole theory" 
(e.g., (17]). Migration is an important element of this theory 
(17, pp.149-150]: 
One justification for pursuing a growth-centre 
policy in a depressed region relates to the supposed 
ability of major urban centres to generate and to 
attract migrants. There are three arguments here . • .. 
These three arguments relate successively, then, to the 
generation, interception and attraction of mig rants . And 
so we must look in this chapter not at the e ff e c t s of 
migration on the fortunes of the growth centre or its 
hinterland ... but at the caus es and natur e of migration. 
We at IIASA are focusing on the causes of migration in the 
demometrics subtask and on the consequenc e s of migration (i.e., 
its consequence for the individual migrant) in the policy analy-
sis subtask. 
Several scholars of internal migration have concluded that 
the experience of migration affects favorably the personal well-
being and satisfaction of the migrant (e.g., [18,19]). However, 
the societal consequences of migration often fall unequally on 
different groups. 
10th 
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Migration, as a mechanism for transferring labor from labor 
surplus areas to labor deficit areas, moves the national economy 
toward greater efficiency. But this adjustment of the national 
labor market has local consequences with regard to equity. And 
it is these negative consequences that often fall on those "left 
behind", since it is the most productive members of the labor 
force that are the ones who move away, leaving behind localities 
increasingly unattractive for industrial investment (19]. 
The various individual and societal consequences of internal 
migration have broad implications for national policies dealing 
with migration and settlement. The built-in conflict between the 
goals of national efficiency and regional equity is a fundamental 
"fact of life" in the design of such policies, one that ultimate-
ly can be resolved only in the political arena . A potentially 
useful tool for illuminating some of the tradeoffs is offered 
by the formal theory of economic policy, first proposed in 1963 
by J. Tinbergen [20] in the field of economic planning (see Figure 
7 , and [ 21 , pp. 11 - 1 2] ) : 
The theory of economic policy is concerned with 
the analysis of decision situations and policy problems, 
using that part of general economic theory which can 
be quantitatively applied to economic data in some 
operational sense .... This analytical framework has 
been used implicitly in other contexts which are not 
economic in any conventional sense. For instance, 
EXOGENOUS 
VARIABLES 
POLICY 
INSTRUMENTS 
z, 
~2 
zi 
SYSTEM OF STRIXTl.RAL ENDOGENOUS UTILITY, WELFARE 
RELA110NSHPS ~EC- VARIABLES OR "OBJECTIVE TING All. '#.RIABLES--
THE "MODEL" FUNCTION" 
GOALS OR "TARGET 
VARIABLES" Y,r Y2 w 
Yi 
x,] 
-':2 
Xs 
Figure 7. The Tinbergen policy framework. 
Source: [21] 
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control engineers and communications systems analysts, 
in developing the theory of servomechanisms and the 
principles of automatic control of a complex physical 
system, start by describing the "laws of motion" of 
the existing physical system by a set of differential 
or difference equations involving variables which are 
controlled (inputs) and other variables which are the 
effects or outputs. Comparisons are made between 
alternative outcomes over time when the controlled vari-
ables are completely absent from the system and when 
they are present at different assigned levels. A set 
of optimal controls is then chosen which in some 
sense provides the best possible outcome, e.g., which 
optimizes a given performance integral in a feedback 
control in the servomechanism theory . 
As the authors of the above quotation point out, "the logical 
structures of some problems of economic policy are formally analo-
gous to problems of decision-making and stabilization or 'steer-
ing' in other fields". We believe that spatial demography is one 
such field, and we therefore are actively exploring the utility 
of this approach for migration and settlement policy analysis 
and design. 
Comparative Study 
The comparative study of migration and settlement (Figure 8) 
has adopted the general framework of two recently published studies 
carried out in a closely related area. Specifically, the compar-
ative analysis of human migration and r edistr ibut io n is being car-
ried out in a manner that is analogous to the procedures used by 
two studies of human mo r tality -fe r tility and r e product i on, namely, 
the book by Keyfitz and Flieger entitled Populatio n: Facts and 
Methods o f Demog r aphy [22], and that edited by Berelson entitled 
Po pu lation Po licy in D~veloped Countr ies [23] (see Figure 9) . 
SURVEY OF NATIONAL PATTERNS & POLICIES 
CASE STUDY: USA - USSR 
OTHER CASE STUDIES 
DAT A BANK & COMPUTER HANDBOOK 
Figure 8. Comparative study. 
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San Francisco 
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Figure 9A. The Keyfitz-Flieger Book [22]. 
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Figure 9B. The Berelson Book [ 23] . 
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The Keyfitz and Flieger book focuses on observed age- and se: 
specific mortality and fertility schedules, and projects the evo-
lution of the populations exposed to these schedules. In order tc 
examine the population trends of the present day, the authors col· 
lect together a data bank of population statistics from more than 
90 countries and subject these to a standardized analytical 
process. 
If national population growth is the primary focus of the 
Keyfitz and Flieger study, its principal approach for examining 
such growth is embodied in a collection of computer programs that 
provide the vehicle for analyzing population growth in a consis-
tent and uniform manner. These programs and the mathematical 
models that underlie them are also presented in the study volume. 
Finally, the major contribution of the Keyfitz and Flieger 
study is the uniform application of a consistent methodology to 
a vast amount of data in order to trace population growth trends 
in a large number of countries. 
The focus, approach, and contribution of the Keyfitz and 
Flieger study have much in common with those of the comparative 
study of migration and settlement. The focus of the latter also 
is population growth, but spatial population growth. The approac 
also relies on a uniform set of computer programs, but these 
embody the models of multiregional mathematical demography [24]. 
And the expected contribution also is that of linking data and 
theory, but the data and theory that are linked are spatial in 
character. 
There are several important differences between the two stud 
formats: 
A primary concern of the Keyfitz and Flieger study is 
population reproduction and the demographic transition 
from high to low birth and death rates. An important 
focus of the comparative migration and settlement study 
is population redistribution and the mobility transition 
[25] from low to high migration rates. 
The Keyfitz and Flieger study is the product of two 
authors; the comparative migration and settlement study 
requires the collaborative efforts of an international 
team of scholars residing in various member and non-
member nations. 
The Keyfitz and Flieger study identifies trends and the 
numerical consequences of the continuation of such trendE 
into the future; the comparative migration and settlement 
study is, in addition, striving to link national trends 
with explanatory variables. 
Although Chapter 4 of their book is entitled "Policy 
Dilemmas and the Future", the Keyfitz and Flieger study 
does not deal with national policies. (Their Chapter 
4 is only three pages long.) The comparative migration 
to 
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:l 
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ls 
it 
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and settlement study, however, explicitly considers the 
national migration and settlement policies of each 
country represented. In this respect, the study resem-
bles more the study of population policies coordinated 
by Berelson (23]. 
The book edited by Berelson is a review of population poli-
cies in 24 developed countries. The individual chapters were 
written by collaborating scholars residing in the particular 
countries. Thus, for example, Professor Charles Westoff of 
Princeton's Office of Population Research wrote the chapter on 
population policy in the USA, and Professor Dimitri Valentei of 
Moscow State University's Population Center authored the chapter 
on population policy in the USSR. 
According to Berelson, "the collaborators were given a com-
mon outline as a guide to the topics to be addressed, but each 
author was free to prepare his report in his own manner". It is 
therefore not surprising that different authors elected to empha-
size different aspects of population policy, and drew on different 
kinds of demographic data to develop their presentations. Thus 
the book is somewhat uneven in its coverage and in the data and 
indicators put forward by the various authors. 
In the migration and settlement study we are striving to 
marry the Berelson approach with the Keyfitz-Flieger approach in 
order to capture the best features of each. Every national analy-
sis in the comparative study of migration and settlement is, as 
in the Berelson study, being carried out in collaboration with 
scholars residing in the countries being studied. However 1 most 
of the data, projections, and indicators that form the foundation 
of the analysis are being processed, as in the Key%itz-Flieger 
study, by a common set of computer programs. These data and 
programs will be published. 
AN ELEMENT OF THE FIRST SUBTASK: SPATIAL ZERO POPULATION GROWTH 
World Zero Population Growth 
Most demographers would agree that current rates of world 
population growth cannot continue for more than a century or two 
without producing a collapse of the present world system. A much 
publicized example of the recent wave of concern over the world's 
"population explosion" is the study sponsored by the Club of Rome 
entitled The Limits to Growth, in which it is asserted that (26, 
p.23]: 
If the present growth trends in world population, indus-
trialization, pollution, food production, and resource 
depletion continue unchanged, the limits to growth on 
this planet will be reached sometime within the next one 
hundred years. The most probable result will be a rather 
sudden and uncontrollable decline in both population and 
industrial capacity. 
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A notable effort to examine a range of alternative projection 
of world population growth is the recent book by Frejka entitled 
The Futu r e o f Populat i on Gr owth : A lte r na t ive Paths t o Eq u ilibrium 
[27] . In this book, the author presents several projections of 
the populations of the developed and less developed regions of the 
world and its major areas . All the projections ultimately con-
verge to a stationary "zero growth" population and differ only in 
the paths by which this zero growth is achieved. Five major paths 
(or projections) are offered. These differ, one from another, by 
the length of the period of fertility decline to replacement level 
(0, 10, 20, 50, or 70 years). 
According to Frejka, the population of the world in 1970 was 
approximately 3.6 billion , out of which a total of 1.1 billion 
were living in the more developed countries and 2.5 billion re-
sided in the less developed nations. The age compositions of 
these two populations were significantly different: the median 
age of the former was 31 years whereas that of the latter was 19 
years. The most important implication of this difference is 
simply that the younger population has a proportionately much 
larger stock of future childbearers and, in consequence, a much 
larger built-in "momentum" for growth. 
Figures 10 and 11 summarize Frejka's principal findings. 
Figure 10 contrasts the five major growth projections, demon-
strating that [27, pp.52-54]: 
Provided the average fertility conditions changed so 
substantially that the NRR [net reproduction rate] de-
clined from its estimated current (1965-70) level of 1.9 
to a level of 1.0 within a few years, the present world 
population of 3.6 billion would . .. settle at around 5.6 
to 5.7 billion inhabitants. If, however, a world fer-
tility decline were brought about very gradually so that 
in, say, 70 years an NRR of 1.0 were attained, then . . . 
world population would settle at over 15 billion. 
Figure 11 disaggregates the population projection of Figure 
10 by "more developed" and "less developed" regions of residence. 
The difference between the two sets of trajectories is striking 
evidence that "future world population growth will increasingly 
be determined by the nature of population growth in the less 
developed regions" [27, p.73]. 
Frejka's book is part of a vast literature on the social, 
economic, and environmental impacts of a reduction of fertility 
to replacement level and the consequent evolution of populations 
to a zero growth condition . But wh e r e p eop le c hoo s e to l i v e in 
the fu t u re p r e s en t s is su es a n d p r o b le ms t hat a r e p o t e n tial ly as 
se r ious as those posed by the numbe r o f childr en t hey choo s e t o 
have . Yet the spatial implications of reduced fertility have 
received relatively little attention, and consequently 1 we are 
ill-equipped to develop adequate responses to questions such 
as the one recently posed by the US Commission on Population 
ns 
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Growth and the American Future* [28, p.13]: 
How would stabilization of the national population affect 
migration and local growth? 
Recognizing the importance of examining the spatial con-
sequences of zero population growth, we at IIASA have applied 
our models of spatial population dynamics to the study of spatial 
zero population growth. 
* 
Figure 10. Growth of world population, projections one to five 
standard set, 1970-2150 (in absolute numbers and 
in percentages). 
Source: [27] 
A notable exception is the work of Peter Morrison, who 
concludes: " ... demographic processes interact in subtle and 
often complex ways, and the mechanisms by which declining 
fertility would influence population redistribution are only 
partially understood. Their elucidation can furnish a clearer 
picture of how and under what circumstances population redis-
tribution can be influenced by public policy" [29, p.547]. 
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developed regions, projections one to five, standard 
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Source : [ 27] 
Spatial Zero Population Growth 
Zero population growth for a nation implies an ave r age of 
zero growth for lo~al areas. This, of course, still allows for 
the possibility of nonzero growth in particular localities. Thus 
spa tia l zero growth, like t empo r a l zero growth, may be viewed 
either as a condition that ultimately prevails uniformly , or one 
that exists only because of a fortuitous balancing of regional 
rates of positive growth, of zero growth, and of decline. Since 
no obvious advantages arise from the latter case, demographers 
quite naturally have viewed the attainment of temporal zero 
growth in the long run in terms of an indefinite continuation of 
temporal zero growth in the short run. We follow this tradition 
and view the attainment of spatial zero growth in the long run 
in terms of temporal zero growth within each region of a closed 
multiregional population system . In consequence, we confine our 
attention here to the evolution of a particular subset of sta-
tionary populations, called spatial zero - growth populations , i . e . . 
stable multiregional populations that have a zero growth ra~e . 
Thus we augment the usual twin assumptions of a fixed mortality 
schedule and a fixed fertility schedule, set at replacement level 
with the assumption of a fixed migration schedule. 
. , 
L, 
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If age-specific death rates are fixed and replacement level 
birth rates remain unchanged, a population that is closed to 
migration will ultimately evolve into a stationary population. 
The characteristics of such a population are well known. The 
number of individuals at any age would remain fixed, and the total 
number of deaths would equal exactly the total number of births. 
Because mortality risks would be relatively low from just after 
birth through middle age, the age composition of such a population 
would be nearly rectangular until ages 50 or 60, tapering much 
more rapidly thereafter with the increase in deattt rates among 
the older population. 
The maintenance of a stationary population requires that 
parents have only as many children as are needed to maintain a 
fixed number of births every year. This means, for example, that 
a 1,000 women must on the average produce a 1,000 baby girls dur-
ing their lifetime. Moreover, since some girls will not survive 
to become mothers, those who do must have slightly more than 
1,000 daughters in order to compensate for those who don't. 
Hence the gross reproduction rate (GRR) must be greater than 
unity by an amount just sufficient to maintain a net reproduction 
rate (NRR) of unity. For example, about 97 to 98 percent of 
the women in the United States today survive to the principal 
ages of childbearing. Consequently, those who do must have 
approximately 1.027 daughters, on the average, as they pass through 
the childbearing ages. In other words, the GRR must be f.027 in 
order for the NRR to be unity.* 
The Momentum of Spatial Zero Population Growth 
Differences between most observed population age compositions 
and those of stationary populations make it virtually impossible 
to attain zero growth in the near future. A closed population's 
birth rate and growth rate depend on its fertility schedule and 
its age composition. Consequently, whether and how long a pop-
ulation continues to grow after achieving a net repronuction 
rate of unity depends on that population's age composition and 
its degree of divergence from that of a stationary population. 
The ratio by which the ultimate stationary population exceeds a 
current population is the "momentum" of that population, a quan-
tity that recently has been given analytical content by Keyfitz 
[30] who shows that the momentum of a .. J?opulation numbering K 
* Because there are usually about 105 baby boys born for 
every 100 baby girls, mothers in a stationary population of 
males and females would need to have a total rate of reproduction 
about three percent more than twice 1.027. In this way we obtain 
the total fertility rate of 2.11 used, for example, in the US 
Census Bureau projections [31]. 
-20-
individuals, with an age composition close to stable, may be 
approximated by the expression 
y 
K 
b e (0) 
r µ (
R (0) - 1 ) 
R(O) 
( 1 ) 
where b is the birth rate, r is the rate of growth, e(O) is the 
expectation of life, and R(O) is the net reproduction rate--all 
measured before the drop in fertility--and µ is the mean age of 
childbearing afterward. Observe that equation (1) also may be 
expressed as 
where 
Y e(O)Q 
Q bK 
rµ (
R(0)-1) 
R(O) 
is the number of births in the (ultimately) stationary population. 
Note that since the derivation assumes the population to be ap-
proximately stable before the decline in fertility, b and r are 
intrinsic stable rates of the initial (nonstationary) regime of 
growth. 
Straightforward population projection calculations may be 
used to obtain the future population that evolves from any par-
ticular observed or hypothetical regime of growth. Therefore 
equation (1) is not needed to obtain a numerical estimate of an 
ultimate stationary population. However, Keyfitz's simple mo-
mentum formula gives us an understanding of the population 
dynamics that are hidden in the arithmetical computations of a 
population projection. It identifies in an unambiguous way the 
five parameters of a current population that determine the size 
of the ultimate stationary population. 
We at IIASA have developed a spatial generalization of 
Keyfitz's momentum formula. We begin by estimating the ultimate 
size of the total stationary births, Q, by means of equation (1); 
next, we distribute that total among the various regions accord-
ing to the allocation defined by the characteristic vector as-
sociated with the unit root of the "reduced" net reproduction 
matrix R(O); then premultiplying the resulting vector by the 
matrix of expectations of life at birth e(O), we find the vector 
of regional zero-growth populations {y},-i.e., 
~ (0) {Q} (2) 
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where {Q} is scaled to sum to Q, the latter coming from Keyfitz's 
single-region formula. 
Equation (2) may be used to dramatically underscore our 
earlier assertion that where people choose to live in the future 
presents issues and problems that are potentially as serious as 
those posed by the number of children they choose to have. Con-
sider, for example, the projection to zero growth of India's 
population that was recently carried out by Ryder on the basis 
of the following assumptions [32, p.6): 
To simplify the task of projecting the population 
of India, we make the following assumptions: it is a 
stable population with a growth rate r = +0.025 and 
survival functions corresponding to those labelled 
"West, level 13" (for which the female and male ex-
pectations of life at birth are 50 and 47.114 1 re-
spectively) in the Coale/Demeny collection; the mean 
age of (gross) maternity m = 29; the ratio of male 
to female births k = 1.05; and the current population 
size is 600 million. 
From these assumptions it follows that the initial number of 
female births per annum B(t) equals 12.156 million, R(O) equals 
2.019, and µ equals 28.672 years. Applying equation (1), Ryder 
finds a Q of 8.558 million and a zero growth population of 851 
million. He then shows that if India's survival level rises to 
e(O) equals 70 years for females and e(O) equals 66.023 years 
for males, and 
... if replacement level fertility takes 40 years 
to achieve and the mean age of gross reproduction 
declines from 29 to 27, the ultimate female birth 
cohort size will be ... 15.029 million. Given that 
value, ... the consequent ultimate population size 
is 2.094 billion [32, p.7]. 
Ryder concludes that "the thought of a population of 2.1 billion 
for India is staggering", and goes on to examine in what respects 
the components of his projection may be modifiable. 
There is no question but that a 2.1 billion population for 
India is staggering. What is even more mind-boggling, however, 
is that approximately 70 to 80 percent of this total is likely 
to be found in that nation's already teeming and over congested 
urban areas (the current figure is 20 percent). To show this, 
we need only introduce a few additional assumptions and then 
apply equation (2). Specifically, assume that life expectancy 
is 55 years in urban areas and 45 in rural areas, with the mi-
gration pattern being such that 
e (0) [ 
50 20 ] 
5 25 
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Assume, further, that the spatial pattern of net reproduction 
after the drop to replacement fertility is given by 
A [0.85 0. 45] g(O) 
0. 1 5 0.55 
Then, 
[3/4] {Q} Q 
1 /4 
and 
[::] [': 20] [0 .75] [ 0.80] {y} = Q x = y million 25 0.25 0.20 
Thus, under our assumptions, a fertility reduction that allows 
a woman one baby girl puts roughly 80 percent of India's ulti-
mate zero-growth population into urban areas (Alternative A in 
Figure 12). A similar calculation using an alternative scheme of 
fertility reduction (i.e., proportional fertility reduction) give 
about 72 percent for the same figure (Alternative B in Figure 12) 
Figure 12 summarizes the above results. Note that the 
"momentum" for urban areas varies from 500 to 1400 percent, 
depending on the time that it takes for the fertility decline to 
occur and on the spatial pattern of that fertility reduction. 
CONCLUSION 
Internal migration and human settlement patterns are in-
creasingly becoming subjects of governmental concern, both in 
developed countries and in the developing nations of the Third 
World . Whether the problem is that of ensuring an adequate 
supply of labor in Siberia or one of stemming the vast flood 
of migrants from the farms and villages of Latin America to its 
overcrowded major cities, the need for a well-developed under-
standing of the relationships between spatial population dynam-
ics and socio-economic development is clear. A stark reminder 
of this need recently appeared on the editoral page of the Inter-
national Herald Tribune [in 33, p.4]: 
Bombay - The doors of the jumbo jet swing open and 
the night air rushes in. The warm stench of indus-
trial waste and human excrement overpowers the smell 
n. 
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Figure 12. Growth of India's population to zero population growth (ZPG). 
Source: [ 34 J 
of jet exhaust . This is Bombay--city of six million, 
industrial giant, metropolis of the western seaboard, 
ringed by forests of chemical plants, textile mills 
and engineering factories. Inside are the people, 
crushed together, man on man, woman on woman, child 
on child. Squeezed between humanity run the open 
sewers, full of the putrid outpourings of an over-
wrought civilization. 
Bombay at the end of the 17th century had only 10,000 
inhabitants. By 1872 it was 644;000. Today, the 
density of population is higher than Manhattan's and 
growing steadily. Only economic recession keeps the 
numbers down. For once the wheels of industrial 
society move, the people come in their hordes leaving 
the economic insecurity of the villages for this city 
where they think there must be hope. 
Dr. A. Mehta, chief economic adviser of Tata Indus-
tries ... estimates the number of under-employed as 
about 20 million, or 10 percent of the labor force. 
By AD 2000, he argues, India will have to find jobs 
for an additional 200 million people .... He concludes 
that the urban-industrial world is not the answer to 
this problem ... [He] believes this great nation ... will 
have to turn its back on its old developmental ideas 
.•. of escaping poverty through industrialization. It 
will have to begin taking its agriculture seriously 
and hold its people on the land and in the villages. 
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